



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL


S/1997/436
5 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 5 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 3 June 1997 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, giving details of the aerial violations that have accompanied the incursions into Iraq's territory by the Turkish armed forces and urging the United Nations to meet its responsibilities as laid down in the Charter and to halt the intimidation and aggression to which Iraq is constantly being subjected.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Identical letters dated 3 June 1997 from the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-
General and to the President of the Security Council

Further to my letter of 31 May 1997 concerning fresh incursions into the territory of the Republic of Iraq by Turkish armed forces (S/1997/420, annex), I should like to inform you that the Turkish aerial violations have been continuing. The details are set forth hereunder.

1. Between 0910 and 2200 hours on 27 May 1997, Turkish fighter aircraft violated the airspace of the Republic of Iraq with eight sorties. This aerial activity was centred on the Amadiyah, Zakho, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Dohuk, Ba'aj and Pibu areas.
2. Between 0850 and 1220 hours on 28 May 1997, Turkish fighter aircraft violated the airspace of the Republic of Iraq with five sorties. This aerial activity was centred on the Zakho, Batufah, Amadiyah, and Sarsank areas.
3. Between 1320 and 1350 hours on 29 May 1997, Turkish fighter aircraft violated the airspace of the Republic of Iraq with four sorties. This aerial activity was centred on the Pibu and Rawanduz areas.
4. Between 1025 and 1105 hours on 30 May 1997, Turkish fighter aircraft violated the airspace of the Republic of Iraq with eight sorties. This aerial activity was centred on the Batufah, Sarsank, Pibu and Amadiyah areas.

I should like to take this opportunity to refer to the letter dated 25 May 1997 addressed to you by the Deputy Prime Minister (S/1997/393). In that letter he referred to Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq, in particular resolution 687 (1991), which affirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. On that basis, the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq should be considered as a violation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President and members of the Security Council, have taken no measures in regard to this aggression, apart from a brief statement issued by the Secretary-General that was not commensurate with the gravity of the Turkish action.

I should like to reaffirm here that the Security Council's failure to show any interest in this serious incident poses many important questions with regard to the resolutions that the Council has adopted on Iraq. These resolutions have imposed a long series of harsh conditions and sanctions on Iraq, and raise legitimate queries as to just how serious the Security Council is with regard to the implementation of all provisions of its resolutions, and its double standards in dealing with those provisions.

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While drawing the attention of yourselves and the members of the Security Council to this flagrant contradiction in the position adopted towards Iraq, and the obvious hostility to its sovereignty, rights and legitimate authority on the part of the States members of the Security Council, Iraq reserves its complete right to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity and security.

In conveying to you the details of these Turkish violations, the Government of Iraq expresses its condemnation of such acts of military aggression. It does so because the practices of the Turkish forces, as represented by their repeated shelling of towns and villages in Iraq and their unlawful incursions into Iraqi territory, are in flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and the inviolability of its territory and airspace, just as they are incompatible with relations of good-neighbourliness, the Charter of the United Nations, the norms of international law and the 1926 Iraq-Turkey boundary agreement. These practices may also undermine stability in the region as a whole, which is suffering primarily from the anomalous situation created by the United States of America and its allies in northern Iraq.

As stated in my previous letter, the Turkish Government bears full international responsibility for the acts of aggression it commits inside Iraqi territory and for all their consequences, regardless of the alleged reasons it gives.

The Government of Iraq reserves its legitimate right under international law to determine an appropriate response to such brutal military aggression and to seek compensation for the damage caused by these Turkish breaches and violations of Iraq's territory and airspace and for the human suffering inflicted on Iraqi citizens by these acts of aggression. Through you, it renews its call to the Government of Turkey to reconsider its policy with respect to the situation in northern Iraq, to promote the collaboration of the two countries on the basis of considerations of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect for sovereignty and to eliminate the reasons for the persistence of a situation that jeopardizes the interests of both countries.

As, through you, I reiterate my country's call to its Turkish neighbour to respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, I express the hope that the United Nations will meet its responsibilities as laid down in the Charter and that it will halt the intimidation and aggression to which my country is constantly being subjected.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq



Security Council

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S/1997/437
5 June 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period from 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1092 (1996) of 23 December 1996. I shall report to the Council separately on my mission of good offices.

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. During the period under review, the number of serious incidents decreased compared to the previous six months. Nevertheless, the tension along the ceasefire lines remained higher than in the past.

3. Both sides generally respected the ceasefire and the status quo. On a number of occasions, both sides moved forward into the United Nations buffer zone, especially at locations where they dispute the delineation of the ceasefire line. There were frequent discharges of weapons, but only rarely was UNFICYP clearly able to determine the target or the source of the firing. Stone throwing, pointing of weapons and shouting of abuse occurred between the opposing forces, and in some instances at UNFICYP, in those areas of Nicosia where the two sides are in close proximity to each other. Those incidents, although in themselves rather minor, reflect the tension that continued to exist between the two sides along the ceasefire lines.

4. There were a number of shooting incidents. The most serious were two incidents in the area of Louroujina, south-east of Nicosia. On 27 January 1997, the Turkish forces complained that two rifle shots had been fired at a sentry post. On investigation, UNFICYP found a window broken at the post but did not



find the bullets and has not been able to verify the origin of the rounds. In the early-morning hours on 6 February 1997, UNFICYP received a complaint that National Guard intruders had attempted to steal a flag; Turkish Cypriot Security Forces had fired at the intruders, who had withdrawn under covering fire of the National Guard. UNFICYP investigated the scene of the incident at first light and found some blood on the ground. The National Guard reported hearing shots but denied any involvement in the incident. UNFICYP's investigation was not conclusive.

5. Military construction by both sides continued. Of particular note was the continued strengthening of positions by the National Guard in Nicosia near Nicosia International Airport, in the area of the Nicosia Central Prison and along the ceasefire lines east of the city. The Turkish forces continued construction and improvement of positions along the length of the buffer zone. These activities were protested by UNFICYP, but with little effect. In two areas west of Nicosia, the Turkish forces disputed the delineation of the ceasefire line and interfered from time to time with United Nations patrols in the buffer zone.

6. There were again a number of violations of the airspace of Cyprus. In March and April 1997, there were five reports of overflights by Turkish Air Force aircraft, all of which were protested by the Government of Cyprus. In official public statements in May, the Greek Government announced that Greek military aircraft would not enter Cypriot airspace during the planned "Toxotis" exercise, and the Turkish Government announced that the Turkish forces would reciprocate in their exercises scheduled for this year.

7. As previously reported (S/1995/1020, paras. 7 and 10), UNFICYP continued to inspect regularly the underground facilities and park on the Roccas Bastion in Nicosia. There were only minor changes and UNFICYP found no indication that the area is being used for military purposes.

8. UNFICYP continued to monitor the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. Some buildings continue to be occupied by students. There were again cases of property being removed from buildings; UNFICYP protested these to the Turkish forces. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha.

9. On 6 January 1997, the Government of Cyprus announced the purchase of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. According to official public statements, the missile systems are scheduled to arrive in Cyprus some 16 months after the date of the purchase order, towards the middle of 1998. While the Government emphasized that the missile systems were of a purely defensive nature, the announcement of the purchase drew a strong response from Turkey, including threats to retaliate if the missile systems were deployed. On 10 January, I issued a statement in which, inter alia, I recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 1092 (1996), had expressed grave concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments and the rate at which they were being expanded, upgraded and modernized. I also reminded all sides that the Charter of the United Nations forbids the threat or use of force in situations such as this.

10. Last October, UNFICYP presented to the military authorities on both sides specific proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire line: by: (a) an extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to include all areas where the military are in close proximity to each other; (b) the prohibition of loaded weapons along the ceasefire lines; and (c) the adoption of a code of conduct, based on the concept of use of minimum force and proportionate response. In its resolution 1092 (1996) the Security Council called upon the parties to accept these measures as a package without delay or preconditions.

11. Despite a total of 40 meetings with both sides at the Chief-of-Staff level, progress has not been possible. On some aspects, a convergence of views was achieved between UNFICYP and one or the other side, but no agreement was reached with both sides on the same subject. Although both sides accepted that the above proposals represent an integrated package, they frequently made the submission of their respective comments contingent upon the other side reciprocating. Even though it was repeatedly made clear that each side was dealing separately with UNFICYP as the impartial broker, who would consolidate the comments of both military authorities into an acceptable compromise package for their final agreement, each side continued to insist that they only respond to individual comments of the respective other side. As a result, the process was extremely slow, and only on 26 May did both sides submit detailed comments and suggestions on all elements of UNFICYP's proposals. UNFICYP is continuing its efforts, with a view to eliciting a positive response from both sides to the entire package of proposals, as called for by the Security Council.

12. UNFICYP's movement in the northern part of the island continued to be restricted, notably in the Kormakiti area where United Nations personnel were refused access to certain areas and restricted in carrying out humanitarian tasks.

13. There are 39 minefields and booby-trapped areas inside the buffer zone and a further 71 located within 500 metres of it. UNFICYP has requested both sides to assist in confirming the scale of the problem before presenting detailed proposals for the removal of those minefields located within the buffer zone.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

14. UNFICYP intensified its efforts to promote and facilitate bicomunal events with a view to increasing communication and cooperation between the two communities and building trust and mutual respect. In this regard, UNFICYP is working closely with interested diplomatic missions on the island. The Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone has been the venue of many bicomunal events held under the auspices of UNFICYP, diplomatic missions or on the initiative of non-governmental and professional organizations from both sides. The Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to insist that the attendance by Turkish Cypriots at such events requires specific authorization in each case. Since late January 1997, such authorization has usually been granted for events in the buffer zone and, though less consistently, for events in the southern part of the island.

15. On 19 April 1997, 437 Turkish Cypriots were able to make a pilgrimage to the Hala Sultan Tekke mosque in Larnaca without any restrictions being imposed

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by the Government. Unfortunately, a reciprocal pilgrimage to the church of Apostolis Andreas by 600 Greek Cypriots, scheduled for Orthodox Easter on 27 April, was cancelled at the last moment by the Greek Cypriot side because the authorities in the north insisted on the deletion of three individuals from the list of participants.

16. On 19 May, a bicomunal concert by two well-known singers from Greece and Turkey was held under the auspices of the United Nations operation in Cyprus at a soccer field in the buffer zone next to the Ledra Palace checkpoints. Some 3,000 Cypriots from both communities attended the concert, which took place in a completely positive and peaceful atmosphere. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots mixed readily, singing and dancing together and exchanging flowers and addresses. Police from both sides were particularly effective in providing security for the concert.

17. The concert generated a great deal of debate about bicomunal contacts, which certain Greek Cypriot groups opposed on the grounds that Turkish troops were still on the island. A demonstration on 19 May in Nicosia in protest against the bicomunal concert was organized by the Cyprus Motorcyclist Federation and the Pan-Cyprian Anti-occupation Movement and resulted in violent clashes with the police.

18. Demonstrations by Greek Cypriots continued at the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia with the purpose of dissuading tourists from crossing to the northern part of the island. These demonstrations discouraged some tourists and at times impeded the movement of United Nations and diplomatic personnel. UNFICYP repeatedly called upon the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that movement through the checkpoint is not impeded or deterred. In contrast, the restrictions imposed in response by the Turkish Cypriots were lifted in late January (see para. 15 above).

19. UNFICYP continued to carry out humanitarian tasks in respect of Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the northern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the southern part. There are now 479 Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area and 187 Maronites in the Kormakiti area. There are some 343 Turkish Cypriots known to UNFICYP in the southern part of the island. The living conditions of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the northern part of the island have changed little from those reported previously (see S/1996/411, paras. 22-25 and S/1996/1016, paras. 21-22). Of the recommendations arising from the humanitarian review UNFICYP undertook in 1995 (S/1995/1020, paras. 20-25, and annexes), the Turkish Cypriot authorities have maintained improvements in terms of relaxation of restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites introduced in early 1996. But the other recommendations have not been implemented. UNFICYP continues to seek full implementation of the recommendations. UNFICYP's humanitarian work continued to be impeded by the presence of police officials whenever UNFICYP humanitarian officers were interviewing Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area.

20. The aftermath of the intercommunal violence of last summer continued to have an adverse effect upon the Turkish Cypriots working in the southern part of the island or in the buffer zone in the mixed village of Pyla. Unemployment for these Turkish Cypriots remained very high. The Government is paying

unemployment benefits and measures have been taken to extend payments beyond the normal limit. Projects are being explored with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to improve the physical amenities in Pyla and create opportunities for work for otherwise unemployed Turkish Cypriot residents there.

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

21. UNFICYP continued to act as the intermediary between the two communities and to facilitate cooperation in such areas as the equitable distribution of water and electricity. The water resources on the island are very limited and UNFICYP strives to ensure effective cooperation between the two communities in order to prevent shortages.

22. UNHCR continued to administer a humanitarian programme funded by a voluntary contribution from a Member State. The main areas of cooperation were in sanitation, health, environment, agriculture, veterinary science, rehabilitation of culturally important sites and the Nicosia Master Plan. Regular bicomunal meetings on these matters were held at the UNHCR offices.

23. After a thorough independent review of the programme, UNHCR has decided to terminate its participation in this activity at the end of 1997. It will retain its office in Cyprus to continue implementation of its mandated responsibilities for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers.

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

24. In his last report to the Security Council (S/1996/1016, para. 27), my predecessor mentioned that, despite the substantial work carried out by both sides, no agreement had been reached on the four points contained in his letters to the leaders of the two communities dated 4 April 1996. On 4 December 1996, he addressed a second letter to the two Cypriot leaders, reaffirming the necessity for the two sides to agree on the four specific points as an indication of their determination to make expeditious progress before initiating the procedure to appoint a new third member. In his second letter, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested the two leaders to agree urgently on the implementation of five specific measures related to the above-mentioned four points.

25. After a careful review of the issues of the missing persons in Cyprus, I share entirely the views of my predecessor contained in his two aforementioned letters and emphasize that it is of the utmost importance to preserve the suggested approach. I urge the leaders of the two communities to comply with the five specific measures contained in the former Secretary-General's letter dated 4 December 1996.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

26. As of June 1997, UNFICYP comprised 1,173 troops and 35 civilian police. The military personnel were from Argentina (396), Austria (315), Canada (2), Finland (1), Hungary (39), Ireland (32) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (388). The police were from Australia (20) and Ireland (15). In addition, UNFICYP had a civilian complement of 335, of whom 40 were recruited internationally, and 295 locally. The deployment of the Force is shown on the map attached to the present report.

27. In view of the experience gained during the events of August 1996 and the subsequent prolonged state of alert, I have requested the contributors of infantry units to increase their strength by a total of 63 personnel all ranks, bringing UNFICYP's strength to its authorized level.

28. Mr. Han Sung-Joo requested that his appointment as my Special Representative for Cyprus not be extended beyond its expiration in April 1997. I have appointed Mr. Diego Cordovez as my Special Adviser with effect from 28 April 1997 to prepare and assist me in chairing the next rounds of inter-communal talks. Mr. Gustave Feissel continued as Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Brigadier General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen completed his tour of duty as Force Commander and has been succeeded by Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara with effect from 28 February 1997.

Financial aspects

29. The proposed budget for the maintenance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. The cost of maintaining the Force for the 12-month period is estimated at \$50,320,400 gross (A/51/755/Add.1). That amount is inclusive of the pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force from the Government of Cyprus and of the \$6.5 million contributed annually from the Government of Greece. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP beyond 30 June 1997, the cost of maintaining the Force will be limited to the amount indicated above.

30. As of 13 May 1997, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the UNFICYP special account amounted to \$13,326,013, representing some 15 per cent of the assessment for the mission since 16 June 1993. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1.6 billion.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

31. During the last six months the situation in Cyprus has been much calmer than in the preceding period. However, there were numerous indications of continuing tension between the two sides.

32. Regrettably, there has been no change in the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernized. Nor have the military authorities accepted the package

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of reciprocal measures proposed by UNFICYP to reduce tension along the ceasefire lines. These are simple practical measures that would not affect the status or delineation of the ceasefire lines, nor would they impair the security of either side. Agreement on these proposals would significantly improve the atmosphere and reduce the potential for violations of the ceasefire and the heightening of tension, which inevitably follows. I strongly urge both sides to reconsider their positions and cooperate with UNFICYP to reach an agreement on this package without further delay.

33. UNFICYP intensified its efforts to improve the overall atmosphere through bicomunal activities, which help to overcome misperceptions and anxieties between the two communities. For direct contacts between members of the two communities to take place, the support of UNFICYP or diplomatic missions is still essential. It would be desirable if such contacts could take place without formality and on a regular basis. From time to time, those who promote or participate in bicomunal events encounter pressure and even threats within their own community, making their efforts all the more admirable. I urge the two leaders to send clear messages of tolerance and reconciliation to their publics and to facilitate and encourage direct contacts between the two communities.

34. I believe that UNFICYP's presence on the island remains indispensable in order to maintain the ceasefire between the two sides, which is a prerequisite for achieving the settlement sought by the Security Council. Therefore, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 31 December 1997. In accordance with established practice, I am consulting the parties concerned on the matter and shall report to the Council as soon as these consultations have been completed.

35. With regard to my mission of good offices, my representatives have in recent months engaged in a process of intensive consultations, with a view to preparing the ground for direct talks between the leaders of the two communities. I shall inform the Security Council separately on the preparations for those talks.

36. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have given to this peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

37. In conclusion, I wish to express my warm appreciation to Mr. Han Sung-Joo, my former Special Representative, for his dedicated work in the last 12 months. I also wish to pay tribute to Mr. Gustave Feissel, the Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Brigadier General Ahti T. P. Vartiainen, the former Force Commander, to Major-General Evergisto A. de Vergara, his successor, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.



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23 June 1997

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period from 11 December 1996
to 5 June 1997)

Corrigendum

Page 2, paragraph 6

The third sentence should read

In official public statements in May, the Government of Cyprus announced that Greek military aircraft would not enter Cypriot airspace during the planned "Toxotis" exercise, and the Turkish Government announced that the Turkish forces would reciprocate in their exercises scheduled for this year.





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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 11 December 1996 to 5 June 1997)

Addendum

In paragraph 34 of my report of 5 June 1997 (S/1997/437 and Corr.1), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, as expressed in previous meetings of the Council on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.





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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED
NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)


I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997) of 16 April 1997, by which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 6 June 1997 on my recommendations regarding the structure, specific goals and cost implications of an observer mission in Angola that would succeed UNAVEM III. It also covers major developments since my last report dated 14 April 1997 (S/1997/304).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Following my visit to Angola, from 22 to 25 March 1997, the peace process in the country showed significant progress. The establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation on 11 April, the return of the deputies of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to the National Assembly and the enactment into law of the special status of the President of UNITA, were among the measures that contributed to the advancement of the peace process. The Council of Ministers of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation held its first meeting on 18 April to discuss its programme, while the National Assembly convened a plenary session on 22 April and elected several UNITA members and other deputies to posts in various commissions of Parliament.

3. After the adoption of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in close collaboration with the representatives of the Government and UNITA and the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), prepared a list of priority tasks that remain to be completed in accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. On the military side, these include the selection of UNITA members for incorporation into the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of selected UNITA military personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), provision of information on the strength of Mr. Jonas Savimbi's security detachment and the demobilization and disarmament of the civilian population. The political aspects include the normalization of State administration throughout the entire country, submission by UNITA of the list of



its members to be appointed to posts in the local administration, regularization of the status of the UNITA radio station, legalization of UNITA as a political party and the convening of a meeting in Angola between President José Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. On the basis of this list of priority tasks, the Joint Commission adopted an updated implementation timetable on 23 April 1997.

4. At its meeting on 24 April 1997, the Central Intersectoral Operation Group, chaired by the Minister for Territorial Administration, decided to begin the process of the extension of State administration with M'banza Congo (Zaire province), the only provincial capital that had remained under UNITA control. On 30 April, the Governor and other provincial authorities were inducted in a ceremony that was attended by a number of Government ministers and by representatives of UNAVEM III and the three observer States. The Provincial Intersectoral Operation Group was also established and has drawn up plans for the normalization process in all areas in the province controlled by UNITA. After a relatively smooth start, the exercise encountered delays, and it has become obvious that the extension process throughout the country will face serious logistical and psychological problems. I am hopeful that the implementation of various rehabilitation projects within the framework of the Community Development Programme presented to donors at the September 1995 Round Table Conference in Brussels will contribute to overcoming these difficulties. At the same time, the issue of national symbols - the flag and national anthem - is still a very sensitive one in many areas previously controlled by UNITA. On 30 May 1997, high-ranking government and UNITA officials who had arrived from Luanda to participate in a normalization ceremony in the central region were attacked by a local UNITA crowd in what appeared to be an organized protest. The initial steps towards the extension of State administration have also confirmed that the good offices and mediation of the United Nations will continue to be required, especially at the local level, to overcome the persisting political divisions and mistrust.

5. In the meantime, the Government and UNITA have recently agreed on a timetable to extend the State administration structures to municipalities in Benguela, Huambo and Kwanza Sul provinces. However, after a temporary suspension by UNITA, the process resumed in earnest only on 26 May, after strong protest by the Government at the delays.

6. Consultations are currently proceeding on the transformation of UNITA into a national political party. To complete that process, UNITA would be expected to comply with legislation governing the legalization of political parties. In accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA must also complete its demilitarization and lift checkpoints and dismantle other military structures it continues to maintain in some parts of Angola.

7. The long-standing issue of the transformation of the UNITA radio station into a non-partisan broadcasting facility has not yet been fully resolved. Although agreement has been reached on the name and other particulars of the station, the question of the allocation of frequencies is still under discussion.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

8. The overall military situation in the country has remained calm, although recent developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have contributed to a worrisome rise in tension in the northern provinces of Angola. The Government continued to reinforce its troops in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, ostensibly to control the flow of armed elements infiltrating Angola from across the border and to prevent an influx of refugees. On 26 May, the Angolan Minister of the Interior stated that soldiers of the former Zairian regime, together with armed UNITA elements, were also entering Angolan territory in the provinces of Uige, Malange and Cabinda. UNITA, for its part, accused the Government of attempting to take over by force some of the areas previously controlled by UNITA.

9. UNITA also claimed that in the western part of Lunda Norte, around Cafunfo, the FAA were massing troops, thus compelling UNITA to strengthen its positions by withdrawing approximately 100 soldiers from the Muchinda selection and demobilization centre. Although UNAVEM III conducted an investigation, a number of allegations could not be confirmed. The situation in the eastern part of the province was more grave. There were apparently serious clashes resulting in casualties near Andrada, where the FAA has reportedly taken over a number of UNITA-held localities. In both regions, the freedom of movement of UNAVEM III military and police observers was temporarily restricted. My Special Representative took up these issues with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, both of whom promised to cooperate with UNAVEM III in defusing the tensions. The President also promised to authorize staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to gain access to refugees and displaced persons from Angola who are currently stranded on the Democratic Republic of the Congo side of the border.

10. In the meantime, the unsettled security situation persisted in other parts of the country, in particular in Benguela and Huila provinces, where villages and individuals continued to be attacked by various armed elements, including members of the Government Civil Defence Corps. On 19 May, a corporal from the Brazilian battalion was killed and another injured in an apparent act of banditry while escorting a civilian convoy. Although the national police have apprehended one of the perpetrators, I call on both the Government and UNITA to cooperate fully with the investigation of this case. The prevailing insecurity in the countryside is also adversely affecting the activities of international humanitarian personnel.

11. The demobilization of ex-UNITA personnel (see paras. 23-25 below) and their selection for the FAA has been proceeding, albeit at a rather slow pace. In May, the Government delegation to the Joint Commission accused UNITA of continuing to maintain armed personnel in some parts of the country, as well as of deliberately delaying the incorporation of ex-combatants into the national army. During the reporting period, only a small number of UNITA police personnel were quartered, bringing the total number of UNITA armed and unarmed personnel registered in all selection and demobilization centres to 71,055 as at 1 June 1997. However, the number of deserters and absentees exceeded 35 per cent of all the personnel quartered. In the meantime, the number of UNITA troops incorporated into the FAA reached 10,700 personnel, which is far

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short of the expected 26,300 troops, but the Government and UNITA, and subsequently the Joint Commission, agreed to conclude formally the selection process by 31 May since no more volunteers were coming forward.

12. In April, UNITA declared that all its command posts had been dismantled and provided UNAVEM III with lists of its communications equipment, but categorically declined to hand over that equipment to UNAVEM as required by the Lusaka Protocol. While UNAVEM is verifying the validity of these claims, it should be noted that, despite repeated assurances, UNITA has so far failed to provide information about the strength of and weapons in the possession of Mr. Savimbi's security guard. At the same time, the number of illegal checkpoints maintained by the Government and UNITA has slightly increased, still impeding the free circulation of people and goods.

13. UNAVEM military formed units and military observers have been actively involved in all aspects of the peace process mentioned above, verifying the status of the ceasefire, providing good offices and defusing tensions, enhancing confidence-building, escorting civilian convoys and performing engineering and other essential tasks.

14. As at 1 June 1997, the strength of the military component of UNAVEM III, including the military observers and staff officers, stood at 4,700 personnel, down from the peak level of over 7,000 military personnel in 1995 (see annex). While the withdrawal of the formed military units has generally proceeded as planned, the pace of the drawdown had to be adjusted several times to reflect the developments on the ground and, in particular, delays in the extension of State administration and actual closure of the selection and demobilization centres.

15. As members of the Security Council are aware, the timetable for the demobilization of ex-UNITA troops has again been reviewed by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, and it is now envisaged that the selection and demobilization centres in the eastern and south-eastern regions will be closed only by the end of August 1997. Since United Nations troops are expected to provide protection and support to the quartering areas until their formal closure, this would mean that these troops would be able to begin their repatriation movement only in early September. Since all UNAVEM III infantry companies that form the rapid reaction force will be withdrawn in August, I recommend that two reduced infantry battalions be retained in Angola until September in order to protect the last four selection and demobilization centres at Andulo, Lumeje, Chitembo and Licua. Accordingly, the newly revised drawdown plans provide for the repatriation of an additional 900 military personnel in June, 500 military personnel in July and 2,000 troops in August. The remaining 800 troops would leave before the end of September 1997.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

16. The civilian police component of UNAVEM III continued to verify the quartering and to monitor the activities of the rapid reaction police, whose total number was 5,450 as at 1 June. Civilian police officers also continued to monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police and matters related to

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security arrangements for UNITA leaders. Since my last report, the civilian police have investigated a considerable number of individual cases involving allegations of abuse by the national police as well as allegations of human rights abuses. The civilian police component of UNAVEM III is also assuming an increasingly active role in support of the normalization of State administration.

17. While 212 bodyguards for UNITA leaders have completed their training, only 524 UNITA elements have been selected for incorporation into the Angolan National Police and the rapid reaction police, 442 of whom have actually joined the national police. Although the Government has downgraded the selection criteria for service in the Angolan National Police/rapid reaction police, the Joint Commission, with the agreement of the two parties, decided recently to conclude the selection of ex-UNITA combatants for service in the national police.

18. The Government programme for the disarmament of the civilian population has entered into the second phase of implementation, but shows little tangible progress. There is an urgent need to strengthen and enhance this aspect of the peace process, especially in light of the progress achieved in the extension of the State administration. It would be important for the Government to intensify the disarmament awareness campaign in order to encourage voluntary surrender of weapons by the civilian population and to introduce material and financial incentives. Moreover, measures must be taken to disarm members of the Civil Defence Corps, whose activities, in particular in Benguela and Huila provinces, often contribute to undermining stability.

19. A small unit of United Nations observers continues to monitor the human rights situation in Luanda and several key provinces, focusing primarily on training and civic education projects. In order to consolidate the rule of law and to ensure the protection of human rights throughout the country, a well-coordinated nationwide programme is required, together with necessary resources. Such a programme should target, among other things, the restructuring of the judicial and penal systems, and the updating of existing legislation, including criminal and civil codes. Such a long-term project would obviously require additional international assistance. In this connection, I would like once again to commend the European Union for the valuable assistance it has provided to human rights activities in Angola. In the meantime, the special ad hoc group set up by the Government and UNITA within the framework of the Joint Commission has held eight meetings, at which approximately 60 cases of alleged individual human rights abuses were considered. Specific recommendations were made in 37 of these cases, and investigation of the remainder is ongoing. While the Joint Commission intends to hold soon another extraordinary session devoted to the issue of human rights, it is also envisaged that, with the assistance of UNAVEM, the fifth regional seminar on a wide range of human rights issues will be convened in the near future.

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V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

20. During the reporting period, the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and programmes have been closely monitoring the dramatic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and preparing for an anticipated influx of refugees into Angola. While the Government of Angola has attempted to prevent this influx, several thousand refugees managed to cross the border in the area of Dundo (Lunda Norte province), but were turned back. In the meantime, UNITA representatives have confirmed to UNHCR representatives that approximately 1,000 refugees have entered Lunda Norte province in a different area; it appears that many refugees are heading to UNITA-controlled territory, and the Government alleges that there are many armed elements among them. A joint assessment team comprised of representatives of UNHCR, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) has requested permission to cross the border to assess the refugee situation in areas adjacent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the Government of Angola has confirmed to Mr. Beye its readiness to facilitate the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance. The Government also indicated to the United Nations that it would prefer the organized repatriation of refugees from areas formerly controlled by UNITA after the extension of State administration to these areas. It is obvious that agreed, mutually acceptable procedures are needed to deal with this important problem, which could have long-term repercussions for the already tense situation in the northern provinces of Angola.

21. There have also been a limited number of organized resettlements of internally displaced persons, although some planned movements, in particular in Bengo and Huila provinces, are currently in progress. In the meantime, spontaneous movements of internally displaced persons have been registered in some parts of the country as a result of improvement in the security situation. The coordination group for internally displaced persons established in Luanda, which includes representatives of the Government, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, has resumed its regular meetings to coordinate the activities of the provincial groups for internally displaced persons and to develop resettlement plans. With the planned completion of the demobilization process, an increase in spontaneous movement throughout Angola of an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons is anticipated.

22. A Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP crop assessment mission visited Angola from 28 April to 12 May to evaluate the 1996/97 planting season. Preliminary findings indicate that cereal production in 1997 will be lower than that of the previous year, necessitating a continuation of the present level of food assistance. By all indications, the projected number of people in Angola requiring substantial humanitarian assistance will essentially remain the same.

B. Demobilization

23. There have been advances in the demobilization of ex-UNITA combatants during the reporting period. The rapid demobilization programme commenced on 14 April 1997 following approval by the Joint Commission of the special plan, which envisages the demobilization of all excess UNITA combatants currently being accommodated in 15 selection and demobilization centres and 7 centres for the war-disabled. The exercise commenced in the central and southern regions and will be extended to other areas of Angola in the next few weeks. Efforts have been made to ensure that the demobilization, which is envisaged to be completed by the end of August 1997 (with an additional one-month contingency period), is synchronized as closely as possible with the withdrawal of UNAVEM III troops (see para. 15 above). As at 1 June, a total of 10,321 former UNITA combatants of various categories had been formally demobilized throughout the country.

24. Notwithstanding the complexity of the project, the demobilization process has been proceeding relatively smoothly. However, disruptions in moving the ex-combatants from the selection and demobilization centres took place in April and May as a result of interference of local UNITA officials. This interference took the form of the obstruction of the movement of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) convoys, demands for last-minute route and schedule changes, and even the hijacking on 4 May of an IOM convoy in Kwanza Sul province. In the meantime, a separate timetable is now being formulated for the demobilization of excess FAA troops.

25. Effective demobilization is essential to the overall success of the peace process in Angola and to related United Nations activities in this regard. I am encouraged that as at 1 June 1997, over 23,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependants had been transported to their areas of origin or choice and provided with basic medical care and multi-purpose reintegration kits. However, the continued success of this important exercise has been jeopardized by a lack of sufficient funding for IOM activities, which are an essential element of the United Nations consolidated appeal for Angola. In a letter dated 16 May 1997, I appealed to donors urgently to provide the necessary funding in order to maintain the momentum of the demobilization process, at least over the next few months. In addition, funds are critically important for the provision of food to people in selection and demobilization centres and for other relevant humanitarian activities being administered by the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.

C. Demining

26. Over the last two years, UNAVEM III military engineering units and a United Nations contracted company have cleared mines over 9,000 kilometres of roads, which greatly improved the ability of the Angolan population, UNAVEM III personnel and staff of humanitarian relief organizations to move freely throughout the country. UNAVEM also established a Mine Clearance Training Centre, where some 350 Angolan nationals received instruction and were subsequently formed into seven demining brigades. Administration of the Centre has now been transferred to the Angolan authorities, while responsibility for

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logistical support is being transferred to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services. It is expected that the Department of Humanitarian Affairs will continue to provide funds and overall technical supervision for this programme. However, owing to delays in the establishment of the UNDP/United Nations Office for Project Services support structure, UNAVEM III has been requested to provide assistance to the project on a reimbursable basis for an additional period of up to four months. This support will also involve the continued use of UNAVEM III air evacuation and medical facilities for international staff.

27. I wish to acknowledge the excellent work several international non-governmental organizations in Angola are conducting in the field of demining, either unilaterally or under the auspices of the United Nations. Their activities have contributed significantly to alleviating the suffering of the Angolan people, and it is my sincere hope that they will carry on this noble endeavour.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

28. Following the adoption of the 1997 Economic and Social Programme, the Government made arrangements to pay wages and salaries which had been withheld for more than four months. This measure was aimed, among other things, at ending schoolteachers' strikes in Luanda and several provinces. After rising to a rather high monthly rate of 8 per cent in January 1997, inflation has begun to show a significant downward trend and, for the first time in several years, the rate was negative in March. However, this generally positive trend was partly due to non-payment of salaries.

29. During the past two months, foreign exchange rates have remained relatively stable, with some upward movement in mid-May of parallel rate. The normalization of State administration in the provinces may entail additional Government spending. This has already resulted in recent adjustments to the State budget, and may also involve extrabudgetary expenditures, particularly for military operations.

30. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission was in Luanda in early June to carry out annual consultations and continue efforts to get an IMF-assisted, long overdue structural adjustment programme under way. In the meantime, it is expected that a special programme to help strengthen the national capacity for economic management will be launched by July 1997.

31. At the same time, consultations have been initiated among the Government, UNDP, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit on the transitional arrangements from provision of humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation and development programmes. This transition will focus on strengthening the national capacity for coordination of humanitarian operations and integration of humanitarian requirements into national development programmes. With the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the Government has begun to focus its attention on non-oil sectors of the economy, in particular those related to exploration of

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other natural resources. Discussions have been initiated with some international private companies to identify possible additional areas of collaboration. These welcome developments will no doubt result in the creation of jobs and generation of income which is particularly important in the present economic environment in Angola.

VII. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

32. In my report of 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115), I presented to the Security Council comprehensive proposals regarding the mandate, goals and structure of a possible United Nations follow-on mission in Angola. These recommendations are still valid, although the delays observed in the fulfilment of certain aspects of the Lusaka Protocol will require the new mission to undertake additional responsibilities in order to facilitate the implementation of those tasks which have been only partially accomplished. In addition to these important responsibilities, the overall mandate of the follow-on mission would be to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.

33. In formulating the concept of operations of the follow-on mission, special consideration should be given to the need to bridge the deep political, psychological and even regional divisions in the country, and to foster mutual trust which has been severely undermined by one of the longest-running conflicts in Africa. Achieving these goals would obviously require patience, perseverance and readiness to lead the peace process to a successful conclusion, not only on the part of the Government and UNITA, but also of the international community, so as to establish a solid foundation for peace in Angola. As indicated in section VII.B below, I have once again reviewed the requirements for the new mission in order to make it as cost-effective as possible, while ensuring that it is endowed with the necessary human and material resources.

A. Main objectives and mandate of the mission

1. Political aspects

34. The experience of the United Nations involvement in Angola and the progress achieved so far in the peace process have clearly demonstrated the vital role played by the United Nations and the three Observer States in promoting the resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. With the participation of UNITA in various Government institutions and civil society in general, this leading role remains particularly important in overcoming difficulties facing national reconciliation. This aspect of the ongoing peace process was again clearly underscored during the recent incidents in the northern provinces of Angola (see para. 9 above), and by the tensions associated with the normalization of State administration. Having the above in mind, I recommend that my Special Representative continue to play a strong role in the peace process and to chair the Joint Commission, which has proved to be a vital conflict resolution and implementation mechanism. A continued United Nations public information

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capacity would also be essential for the promotion of political tolerance and national reconciliation.

35. A strengthened Division of Political Affairs would assist the Special Representative in implementing the political mandate of the mission. Among other tasks, the Division would monitor the normalization of State administration throughout the country, provide good offices and mediation at the provincial and local levels and participate in the official organs established for that purpose. It would also monitor and verify the integration of UNITA elements into State structures, as provided for in the Lusaka Protocol and subsequent agreements between the Government and UNITA, and assist in the resolution and management of conflicts which may arise. In coordination with other components, the Political Division would also promote a climate of confidence and national accord by establishing a presence in major population areas and areas of tension.

2. Police matters

36. With the withdrawal of United Nations military personnel and the gradual normalization of State administration over the entire Angolan territory, the civilian police component would assume new and expanded responsibilities. It would continue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police, as well as the free circulation of people and goods. With the transformation of UNITA into a political party and the extension of activities of the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and other political parties throughout the country, special attention should be given to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms. With a view to generating confidence among the population, the civilian police would be called on to carry out joint patrols with the Angolan National Police, especially in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, to inspect prisons and, if need be, to establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations.

37. The Mission's civilian police unit would continue to monitor and verify the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population, supervise proper storage or destruction of these weapons and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. With the extension of State administration, the Government police presence will eventually increase in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, which will necessitate the establishment of additional civilian police team sites and reinforcement of the present strength of the police observers.

3. Human rights issues

38. As members of the Security Council are aware, both the Government and UNITA would welcome an enhanced presence of human rights observers and related United Nations activities. Such a presence would contribute to the promotion of human rights and prevention of their abuse in the country. These activities would be aimed at developing the capacity of national institutions and other non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights to investigate

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violations and to initiate appropriate action, including through mechanisms already established for this purpose. On several occasions in the past, the Government and UNITA, within the framework of the Joint Commission, recommended that the role of the small United Nations human rights unit be strengthened and expanded, in order to investigate adequately allegations of abuses. I believe that the Security Council would be justified in supporting the request of the two parties to the Lusaka Protocol, since respect for individual rights and freedoms will no doubt contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace in Angola.

4. Military aspects

39. The withdrawal of the formed military units of UNAVEM III has been proceeding generally within the framework outlined in my previous reports to the Council. However, developments on the ground and, in particular, delays in the demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants and in actual closure of the selection and demobilization centres have necessitated the introduction of adjustments to the withdrawal plan, as described in paragraph 15 above.

40. With the withdrawal of main infantry and support units by August/September 1997, I recommend the retention thereafter in Angola of a reduced number of military observers whose presence would be necessary to verify compliance with various aspects of the ceasefire regime. They would, in particular, continue to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches, and monitor the dismantlement of checkpoints and UNITA command posts, as well as the integration of UNITA soldiers into the FAA. As other components of the mission, the military observers would have full freedom of movement throughout the country.

5. Humanitarian aspects

41. In the next few months, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit will begin to downsize its presence in Angola to reflect the changing circumstances on the ground. In accordance with the additional mandate entrusted to it in February 1995 in connection with the establishment of UNAVEM III, it would continue to support the demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants and their social reintegration. At the same time, the Unit would increasingly focus on the original coordination mandate entrusted to it in 1993, including monitoring the emergency situation and maintaining a capacity to respond to humanitarian needs as they emerge. It would thus serve as the focal point for information, donor liaison and coordination of humanitarian operations through an established network of field advisors in key provinces.

6. Administrative aspects

42. In paragraphs 45 to 47 of my report of 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115), I described in detail the challenges that would be faced by the administrative component of the follow-on mission, as logistical support would have to be provided to headquarters of the follow-on mission in Luanda, to the political, police, human rights and military components in six regional headquarters, and to almost all provincial capitals and over 30 other outstations. Initially, the administrative and logistical requirements of the mission would increase slightly, to compensate for the transport and communication capabilities that had been previously provided by the formed military units of UNAVEM III. Some administrative personnel would have to be redeployed to assume various operational tasks currently performed by military personnel, including staff officers. The great size of Angola and the lack of a viable infrastructure will continue to affect the complexity of various functions required to be carried out by the administrative component.

43. The existing resources allocated for UNAVEM III by the General Assembly will be used to ensure a smooth transition to an observer mission. UNAVEM III is already developing a transfer and liquidation plan leading towards the follow-on observer mission and has, within its 1997-1998 budget, made some very pressing requisitions. The average age of much of the UNAVEM III equipment far exceeds accepted write-off parameters. Most of the fleet of UNAVEM vehicles has been in use for five years, and the average per vehicle accumulation of 100,000 kilometres exceeds the possibility of maintaining them under reasonable safety standards.

44. Furthermore, obsolete communications and computer equipment already complicates the mission's ability to cope with anticipated requirements; replacements would be necessary to establish a reliable network of voice communication and data transmission, especially between Luanda and the regions, which at present is dependent to a great degree on the capabilities of the departing formed military units. A great deal of other equipment is either obsolete or has served out its usefulness, rendering it unfit for transfer to other peacekeeping operations or the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. It is recommended that the present UNAVEM III fleet of fixed-wing aircraft be reconfigured once the military units have departed to adapt to the needs of the follow-on mission.

B. Organizational structure

45. The organizational structure of the new mission would be as follows:

(a) The mission, with headquarters in Luanda, would be headed by the Special Representative, who would continue to be assisted by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as by the necessary professional and support staff, albeit at a reduced level. The public information and interpretation sections would remain at the present level at the initial stages of the new operation, but would begin to be downsized by the end of 1997. Since the Special Representative would continue to chair the Joint Commission, a small secretariat would be provided by the United Nations;

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(b) The Political Division, headed by a Director, would have offices in most of the 18 provinces of Angola, in addition to a headquarters cell in Luanda, bringing the overall strength of the Division to 28 Professional staff assisted by necessary support staff. Senior political officers stationed in six operational regions would serve as coordinators responsible for all activities of the observer mission, replacing the military commanders who are currently performing these functions;

(c) The civilian police component would be headed by a Police Commissioner with the rank of Chief Superintendent. This component would maintain headquarters and a special task force in Luanda. The police observers, whose total number would increase by 85 (i.e. from 260 to 345), would be deployed to each of the 6 regional headquarters and 36 outlying teamsites each with 6 to 7 police observers;

(d) The human rights component would be headed by a Director and would have two monitors in almost all provinces, with a total of 29 Professional staff supported by 26 United Nations volunteers;

(e) After the withdrawal of the main body of military units, the military component of the follow-on mission would be headed, as of October 1997, by a Chief Military Observer with the rank of Brigadier-General. It would have a reduced number of military observers: 86 compared to the current authorized strength of 350. In addition, the military component would retain a reduced military helicopter company to provide the mission with the necessary investigative and medical evacuation capabilities and two small military medical dressing stations. In light of the Organization's experience in other peacekeeping operations, I also recommend the postponement, until the end of November 1997, of the repatriation of one United Nations infantry company to ensure proper protection of United Nations property, which is an important aspect in any withdrawal exercise; this company would be stationed at the mission's logistical bases in Luanda and Lobito;

(f) The administrative component would be headed by a Chief Administrative Officer and would comprise Professional and General Service staff adequate for the downsizing and liquidation of UNAVEM III and the implementation of the mandate of the follow-on mission.

46. Upon completion of the demobilization process, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit would be gradually reduced in size. Under the follow-on mission, it would continue to support the demobilization exercise, including the provision of material and human resources for the selection and demobilization centres, as well as the Demobilization and Reintegration Office. According to current plans, the gradual downsizing of the Demobilization and Reintegration Office would entail a reduction from the current 17 Professional posts to 14 in August and 3 by December 1997, so as to take into account the delays in the demobilization exercise. The United Nations Volunteers posts would be reduced from 30 to 21 in August, with only 2 posts remaining by December. By the end of 1997, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit would have 14 international Professional and 22 national posts, all of which would be funded through voluntary contributions; it

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would continue to report directly to the Special Representative on all humanitarian matters related to the peace process.

47. All components of the follow-on mission would function under the overall authority of the Special Representative, who would coordinate all United Nations activities in support of the peace process. The mission would rely on integrated logistical, communications and transport systems to ensure maximum flexibility, operability and cost-effectiveness. Having the above in mind, all components of the new mission, to the greatest extent possible, would be deployed together. In the meantime, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997) of 16 April 1997, I have initiated the transition of UNAVEM III to an observer mission (as described in section VII of my report dated 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115)) by making arrangements for the deployment to Angola of a small number of additional political, police and human rights staff.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

48. Despite persistent difficulties and delays, events in Angola since my visit in late March 1997 have generally been moving in a positive direction. The formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the return of UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, the beginning of the normalization of State administration and the demobilization of ex-combatants represent important steps towards the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and provide a strong basis for the process of national reconciliation.

49. However, despite the progress achieved recently, the road towards lasting peace in Angola remains a difficult one. The recent tensions in the northern part of the country have underscored the unsettled situation prevailing in some areas of the country. The process of extension of State administration to the areas formerly under UNITA control is proceeding at a slow pace and, in some instances, gives rise to incidents such as those which took place in the central region on 30 May 1997 (see para. 4 above). Moreover, the psychological and political barriers between the parties are still wide. In this connection, the holding of the long-overdue meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi as early as possible inside Angola could facilitate the normalization of State administration and accelerate the process of national reconciliation and the peace process in general. Such a meeting could also help to resolve the precarious situation which persists in the border area between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

50. It is currently possible - and indeed imperative - for the parties to accelerate the normalization of State administration and to encourage the process by conducting an intensive public awareness campaign. Equally, I call on the Government and UNITA to cooperate with the United Nations towards the completion of demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants, closure of the selection and demobilization centres, as well as the earliest conclusion of the formation of the united Angolan armed forces. At the same time, I would like to commend the spirit of cooperation and tolerance which characterized the initial steps of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and hope that all parties involved will continue to work harmoniously within the new Government and the National Assembly in order to rehabilitate and rebuild their war-torn country.

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51. The demobilization of tens of thousands of troops and their reintegration into civil society remains one of the most crucial challenges under the Lusaka Protocol. I once again urge the donor community to provide the urgently needed assistance to IOM for the demobilization programmes, as well as the necessary resources to assist former combatants in the quartering areas and the large number of refugees. The link between the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Angola and the consolidation of peace in the country is evident, and I call on the international community to fulfil the pledges made in this regard at the 1995 Brussels Round Table Conference.

52. I am encouraged by the readiness of the Security Council to consider the establishment of a follow-on mission of the United Nations in Angola, bearing in mind my previous recommendations in this regard. I am convinced that the Angolans will continue to need a sustained level of international assistance and encouragement in order to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and to consolidate the gains made thus far in the peace process. Accordingly, a continued, but scaled-down presence of the United Nations in Angola will be required after the expiration of the mandate of UNAVEM III on 30 June 1997. Against this background, I recommend the establishment, as of 1 July 1997, of a new operation to be known as the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola/Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola (MONUA). The mandate and organizational structure of this mission are described in section VII above, and the cost implications are being issued separately as an addendum to the present report.

53. The performance of the new mission and its components will be measured against specific indicators, such as the completion of the demobilization process and the closure of the selection and demobilization centres, the incorporation of ex-UNITA combatants into the FAA and the Angolan National Police, the integration of UNITA personnel in all levels of State administration, which has to be effectively implemented throughout the whole country, elimination of all the impediments to free circulation of people and goods, disarmament of the civilian population and other essential tasks. In view of the magnitude of the tasks which still need to be accomplished, I recommend that the new mission be established for a period of seven months, until 1 February 1998, after which, depending on developments on the ground, it would be gradually drawn down in accordance with plans which I intend to submit to the Security Council by the end of 1997.

54. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and all civilian, military and police staff of UNAVEM III as well as to the personnel of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations for their dedicated efforts in support of the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation in Angola. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three Observer States and to other Member States that have consistently provided assistance to the United Nations in promoting the peace process.

Annex

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III: Contributions
as at 1 June 1997

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops ^a	Total
Bangladesh	10	21	11	203	245
Brazil	20	9	29	715	773
Bulgaria	10	14	-	-	24
Congo, Republic of the	4	-	-	-	4
Egypt	10	15	1 ^b	-	26
France	8	-	11 ^b	-	19
Guinea-Bissau	14	4	-	-	18
Hungary	10	7	-	-	17
India	20	11	44	686	761
Jordan	17	21	2 ^b	-	40
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	19	20	-	-	39
Mali	9	15	-	-	24
Namibia	-	-	3	200	203
Netherlands	15	10	2 ^b	-	27
New Zealand	4	-	7 ^b	-	11
Nigeria	19	21	-	-	40
Norway	4	-	-	-	4
Pakistan	4	-	14 ^b	-	18
Poland	7	-	-	-	7
Portugal	7	28	5	310	350
Romania	-	-	22	760	782
Russian Federation	7	-	2	149	158
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	19	10	1	-	30


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Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops ^a	Total
Ukraine	5	-	3	1	9
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	4	13	27 ^b	10	54
Zambia	10	15	8	503	536
Zimbabwe	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>676</u>	<u>747</u>
Total	<u>302</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>220^c</u>	<u>4 213</u>	<u>4 994</u>

^a Including military police.

^b Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

^c The total figure does not include the four demining experts seconded by Germany.



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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED
NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

Addendum

1. In reference to paragraph 52 of my report dated 5 June 1997 (S/1997/438), I wish to inform the Security Council that the cost of the follow-on mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), is estimated at \$64.5 million for the seven-month period from 1 July 1997 to 1 February 1998.
2. This estimate provides for 193 military contingent personnel, 86 military observers and 345 civilian police monitors, supported by a civilian establishment of some 310 international civilian staff, 250 locally recruited staff and 60 United Nations volunteers.
3. A breakdown of the estimated requirements is provided for information purposes, by main categories of expenditure, in the annex to the present addendum.
4. It is my intention to propose to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to authorize the establishment of the Observer Mission, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to a Special Account to be established for the new mission.



Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)

Estimated cost for the seven-month period from
1 July 1997 to 1 February 1998

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Cost estimate
1. Military personnel costs	5 300
2. Civilian personnel costs	26 850
3. Premises/accommodation	3 700
4. Infrastructure repairs	200
5. Transport operations	1 600
6. Air operations	9 300
7. Naval operations	-
8. Communications	2 000
9. Other equipment	520
10. Supplies and services	11 400
11. Election-related supplies and services	-
12. Public information programmes	120
13. Training programmes	10
14. Mine-clearing programmes	-
15. Disarmament and demobilization programmes	-
16. Air and surface freight	600
17. Staff assessment	<u>2 900</u>
Total	<u>64 500</u>



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/439
9 June 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to submit to you, and through you to the members of the Security Council, the text of an exchange of letters between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations extending, in the light of Security Council resolution 1111 (1997) of 4 June 1997, the Memorandum of Understanding of 20 May 1996 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 986 (1995) for a period of 180 days, effective 8 June 1997.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN



Annex I

Letter dated 7 June 1997 from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations

I have the honour to refer to resolution 1111 (1997), adopted by the Security Council on 4 June 1997, by which the Council decided that the relevant provisions of resolution 986 (1995) would remain in force for another period of 180 days beginning at 0001 hours, Eastern Daylight Time, on 8 June 1997. I should also like to refer to paragraph 50 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the implementation of Security Council resolution 986 (1995), pursuant to which the Memorandum would enter into force on the day when paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 986 (1995) became operational and would remain in force until the expiration of the 180-day period referred to in paragraph 3 of the resolution. Pursuant to that provision, the Memorandum of Understanding is due to expire on 7 June 1997.

In view of the foregoing, I have the honour to propose that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding of 20 May 1996 be extended for an additional period of 180 days, effective 8 June 1997, provided that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that relate to the current Distribution Plan shall be applicable to the new Distribution Plan referred to in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1111 (1997) to be submitted by the Government of Iraq and approved by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The current Distribution Plan shall continue to apply for goods purchased with oil revenues generated within the 180-day period from the day on which resolution 986 (1995) became operational.

If your Government agrees to this proposal, I suggest that the present letter, and your reply thereto, shall constitute an agreement between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq.

(Signed) Hans CORELL
Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs,
The Legal Counsel

Annex II

Letter dated 7 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Legal Counsel of
the United Nations

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Iraq agrees to the proposal contained in your letter of 7 June 1997 for the extension of the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding of 20 May 1996 for an additional period of 180 days effective 8 June 1997.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/440
9 June 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JUNE 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the attached letter, dated 6 June 1997, which I have received from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations (see annex). Attached to the letter is the fifth bi-weekly report on the multinational protection force for Albania, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997.

I should appreciate your bringing the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN



Annex

Letter dated 6 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Italy
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit the fifth report on the multinational protection force for Albania (see appendix). The report is submitted pursuant to the requirement set out in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1101 (1997) of 28 March 1997, in which the Council requested the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, through the Secretary-General, to the Council. The fourth such report was conveyed to you on 23 May (see S/1997/392).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and the fifth report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

Appendix

Fifth report to the Security Council on the operation of the multinational protection force in Albania

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 March 1997, the Security Council adopted resolution 1101 (1997), in paragraph 2 of which it welcomed the offer made by certain Member States to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.
2. In paragraph 9 of the resolution the Security Council requested the member States participating in the multinational protection force to provide periodic reports, at least every two weeks, to the Council through the Secretary-General. The first four reports were provided on 9 April (see S/1997/296), 25 April (see S/1997/335), 9 May (see S/1997/362) and 22 May 1997 (see S/1997/392). The fifth report refers to events between 23 May and 4 June 1997.

II. MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE

Political guidance

3. The Steering Committee, consisting of the political directors of the 10 troop-contributing countries and the Commander of the operation, continues to follow the overall situation on the ground and the full compliance of the activities of the force with the Security Council mandate. To date it has held meetings on 4, 9, 14, 23 and 30 April, 6, 13, 14 and 22 May and 4 June 1997.
4. Representatives of the following international organizations regularly attend the meetings of the Steering Committee as observers: United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Belgium also attends the Committee meetings as an observer.

Cooperation with the Albanian authorities

5. An international meeting on Albania took place in Rome on 26 May 1997 under the chairmanship of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Lamberto Dini, and with the participation of Mr. Franz Vranitzky, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE. The meeting was attended by representatives of all the force-contributing countries and of Belgium, Finland, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The following international organizations were also represented: United Nations and related agencies, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB)

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and ICRC. Albania was represented by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bashkim Fino, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Arjan Starova, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Malaj.

6. The meeting paved the way for a ministerial conference on Albania to be convened in Rome to assess the progress in the international efforts in favour of the political and economic recovery of Albania, give impetus to the process and provide direction for future action.

7. The meeting expressed, inter alia, appreciation for the neutral and impartial way in which the multinational protection force, acting under Security Council resolution 1101 (1997), carries out its mandate and for the positive results so far achieved in guaranteeing the safe arrival of humanitarian aid.

8. The meeting recognized that the presence of the multinational protection force was effectively contributing to the stability of the country and of the region, and stated that the Force, within the framework of its mandate, would contribute to ensuring a safe environment in Albania during the electoral process, taking into account in all possible ways the OSCE electoral concept.

9. The Prime Minister of Italy, Mr. Romano Prodi, visited Tirana on 1 June and had meetings with President Sali Berisha, Prime Minister Fino and other members of the National Reconciliation Government, as well as with the Command of the force.

10. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, visited Tirana on 3 June. He met with President Berisha, Prime Minister Fino, Foreign Minister Starova and the leaders of the main political parties, as well as the Command of the force and Ambassador Herbert Grubmayr, Resident Deputy of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE.

Cooperation with the international organizations

11. The force is helping create a secure environment for several missions of international organizations active in Albania. In addition to the regular contacts between the Steering Committee and the relevant international organizations, the multinational protection force Command in Tirana has daily contact through its civil military cell with the representatives of the main international organizations.

12. Daily contacts take place with representatives of OSCE. A part of the Austrian contingent has taken up duty guarding the OSCE offices. The Command of the force provides helpful analysis of security in the country and shows its willingness to examine, in liaison with OSCE, how to ensure a secure environment during the electoral process.

13. The OSCE Election Observation Coordinator is already assessing the security situation throughout the country on a regular basis, in close coordination with the multinational protection force. Relevant information on deployment of staff of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) within the country is provided to the force.

14. The Commander of the Operation, Admiral Guido Venturoni, together with the Defence Minister of Italy, Mr. Beniamino Andreatta, met Mr. Vranitzky in Vienna on 28 May to hold further discussions on coordination between the force and OSCE during the electoral period. The Director-General of ODIHR, Ambassador Stoudmann, participated in the meeting of the Steering Committee on 4 June and provided information about the ongoing preparations for the elections in Albania.

15. The Council of Europe sent a team of experts to help the Albanian authorities to draft the electoral law and regulations governing media access during the electoral campaign.

16. A WEU team is providing useful advice on the state of preparedness of the Albanian police and their ability to ensure order and safe elections.

17. An EU team is organizing the delivery of EU long-term and humanitarian aid. The EU General Affairs Council on 2 June adopted a "common position" defining the Union's overall action in Albania.

18. A World Bank delegation is working on a post-election recovery programme.

19. ICRC continues its humanitarian deliveries of medicines and food parcels for the poorest families.

20. WFP disembarked a food shipment in Durres under the protection of the force.

Force deployment

21. As at 4 June, the multinational protection force is composed of 6,365 men from 10 countries deployed in the north (Lezhe and Shengjin), in the centre (Tirana, Durres, Elbasan and Fier) and in the south (Vlorë and Argjirokastrë). The composition of the force is as follows: Austria, 113; Denmark, 59; France, 952; Greece, 780; Italy, 2,926; Portugal, one plane crew; Romania, 398; Slovenia, 24; Spain, 342; and Turkey, 771.

22. A Belgian advance team carried out a site survey mission with a view to the planned deployment of a Belgian medical unit.

23. The force is planning further expansion of its deployment to additional cities in the north, as well as in the east and south.

Summary of operations

24. The force is engaged in intense patrol and reconnaissance activity by both day and night in many areas of the Albanian territory and along main lines of communication, as well as in action to support and protect many international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as envisaged by the United Nations mandate.

25. In particular, the force has provided protection to several humanitarian convoys along main roads, in different areas of the country and to international

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organizations and non-governmental organizations carrying out aid distribution projects and programmes.

26. Airlifts and sea transport were provided by the force according to local needs, in some cases also for international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Reconnaissance missions took place extensively. The force's medical units were activated as appropriate.

III. CONCLUSIONS

27. The overall situation in Albania remains tense; however, security is slowly improving, mainly as a consequence of the presence of the force. The Albanian police are not yet in a position properly to counter acts of violence and persisting illegal activities by armed gangs. In some cases the fighting between these gangs has produced clashes that have endangered normal life. Explosions shook central Tirana on 2 and 3 June, wounding several people. Some violence may be politically motivated. Isolated shooting, mostly not aimed at the force, has caused casualties among the civilian population. In several cases the force's units provided help to evacuate wounded people to civilian hospitals or to the force's medical units. On 29 May, unknown persons opened fire at a navy helicopter transporting a seriously injured Albanian girl to an Italian hospital.

28. Public institutions such as customs, tribunals and prisons are slowly restarting their activities. Many more schools and educational institutions, including the University of Tirana, as well as some industries and commercial activities are gradually reopening as an indirect effect of the presence of the force.



Security Council

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
S/1997/441
9 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 June 1997 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. It concerns the practice of the representative of the United States in the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of placing contracts for foodstuffs and medicines on hold for no valid reason.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Permanent Representative



Annex

Letter dated 6 June 1997 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

The representative of the United States in the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) has, at different times, placed on hold contracts Nos. 146, 169, 170, 212, 213, 238, 292, 306, 311 and 334, which are for medical supplies, as well as contract No. 137, for the supply of wheat from France, and contract No. 575, for the supply of sugar from the United Arab Emirates. On each occasion he did so on the pretext that the items covered by the contract in question were not included in the categorized list of goods annexed to the purchase and distribution plan.

On 23 May 1997, the secretariat of the 661 Committee informed our Permanent Mission in New York that the representative in question had lifted the block placed on these contracts after he had found some of the items in the categorized list and the secretariat of the Committee had found the others!

Wheat and sugar, to take a glaring example, are basic items in the categorized list, and the United States representative has approved contracts for their supply to Iraq in the past. They are basic to the ration allotment that is distributed by the Ministry of Trade. I do not know how this representative dares to lie to the Committee and its secretariat and to say that the two items are not included in the categorized list of goods. The same also applies to the medical contracts.

In bringing to your attention conduct which displays contempt for the 661 Committee and the lack of any sense of responsibility and which is, moreover, motivated by factors entirely unrelated to the humanitarian goals of the agreement on oil in exchange for humanitarian needs, I request you to intervene personally with the 661 Committee with a view to expediting the smooth processing of contracts without the promotion of tendentious political objectives. I further request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs



General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/52/176
S/1997/442
12 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: * FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Item 72 (b) of the preliminary list*

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: REGIONAL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Letter dated 6 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative of
the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General

In the context of the general debate on agenda item 72 (b), I have the honour to request you to circulate as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council the statement made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo following the political changes that have taken place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) (see annex).

(Signed) Daniel ABIBI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/52/50.



ANNEX

Statement made on 21 May 1997 by the Government
of the Republic of the Congo

The relations between the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are long-standing, fraternal and multifaceted relations. It is in the context of these relations that the Government of the Republic of the Congo has made efforts on the bilateral and multilateral levels to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced.

The President of the Republic, Professor Pascal Lissouba, has made a personal commitment to these efforts, constantly reaffirming his complete conviction that peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo rest on protecting and strengthening democracy, as well as on participatory systems of governance.

Today, the Government of the Republic of the Congo welcomes the efforts made by the fraternal people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its new authorities to avoid a social and political climate of revenge.

The Republic of the Congo, which holds the chairmanship of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, solemnly reaffirms, on the basis of the Brazzaville Declaration of 6 December 1996 by the Summit of Heads of State and Government, that the establishment of peace and fraternal coexistence among the peoples of our subregion is a guarantee of democracy and of development.

Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of the Congo takes note of the accession to power of the new political authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and expresses its full readiness to support their efforts at reconstruction in democracy.

The Government of the Republic of the Congo appeals to the international community to enable it to cope with the massive influx of refugees into its territory and thus create conditions for their return to their countries of origin.

Lastly, the Government of the Republic of the Congo reasserts its determination to maintain the blood ties and links of fraternity that unite the peoples of the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/443
11 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 11 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 11 June 1997 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. The letter states that there is information to the effect that items whose removal from Iraq is prohibited were in the luggage of the Special Commission's Chilean helicopter crew and that the Special Commission has refused to allow the luggage to be inspected.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Identical letters dated 11 June 1997 from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General
and to the President of the Security Council

In addressing to you this letter on an important matter relating to the actions of the Security Council's Special Commission, I should first like to convey to you the assurances of my sincere esteem. The facts and details concerning the actions in question are set forth hereunder.

1. Boxes containing the personal effects of members of the Chilean crew working on the Special Commission's helicopters were to have been taken out of Iraq by way of Habbaniyah airfield on 5 June 1997. The relevant Iraqi authorities have had available to them information to the effect that the boxes contained items whose removal from the country is not permitted under Iraqi law.

2. Accordingly, the authorities informed the Director of the Special Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), Mr. Nils Carlström, and requested him to proceed to Habbaniyah airfield so that a joint inspection of the boxes could be carried out in his presence in order to check the information received. The BMVC Director, however, rejected this proposal and insisted, given the immunities enjoyed by persons working for the Special Commission, that the boxes should be returned to the Centre where he would inspect them without the participation of the Iraqi side. We rejected this proposal as involving an illegitimate interpretation of the immunities in question. I refer in this connection to article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which clearly states that any inspection shall be conducted by the authorities of the receiving State in the presence of the diplomatic agent or of his authorized representative. The immunities of persons working for the Special Commission are no different from those of a diplomatic mission as set forth in the Vienna Convention, and the Special Commission is well aware of that fact.

3. On 6 June 1997, the political adviser to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in New York, Mr. Gustavo Zlauvinen, proposed to Mr. Sa'id al-Musawi, our Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, that we should accept the proposal that an inspection be carried out inside the BMVC, on the understanding that the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, Rolf Ekéus, would then not inform the Security Council of the alleged helicopter incidents. We rejected this offer.

4. Except for the boxes under suspicion, no obstacle has been raised to the removal from the country of crates and equipment belonging to the Special Commission.

We regard the conduct of the Chilean crew in trafficking in items whose removal from the country is prohibited as being in violation of the country's laws, as inflicting deliberate damage on the national economy and as the commission of premeditated acts that are incompatible with our laws.

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The immunity claimed by the Special Commission for cases such as these has no basis in international law or custom or in the standards of conduct incumbent on those who function on behalf of the United Nations.

By its circular note No. 11/84/100/98156 of 16 September 1995, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq informed the Special Commission and all accredited international and regional organizations and diplomatic missions in Baghdad that, in view of the circumstances created by the embargo unjustly imposed on Iraq, the customs authorities at border crossing points would be obliged to inspect luggage suspected of containing items whose export or removal from the country was not permitted and that they would do so in the presence of a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the mission concerned. The Ministry annexed to its note a list of those items whose removal from Iraq is prohibited.

Accordingly, the removal of such items from Iraq under the cover of the missions of the Special Commission is to be regarded as blatant exploitation of its terms of reference as set forth in the relevant Security Council resolutions and as the infliction of deliberate harm on Iraq and on its national interests.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/444
11 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
AND RUSSIAN

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions and the statements of its President,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Tajikistan of 30 May 1997 (S/1997/415),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Tajikistan and to the inviolability of its borders,

Welcoming the signing by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition in Moscow on 8 March 1997 of the Protocol on military issues (S/1997/209, annex II), in Bishkek on 18 May 1997 of the Protocol on political issues (S/1997/385, annex I) and in Tehran on 28 May 1997 of the Protocol on the guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (S/1997/410, annex),

Taking note that these agreements foresee the support and assistance of the international community, in particular the United Nations, in different aspects of their implementation,

Expressing concern that the security situation in Tajikistan remains precarious, and that the humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1997;
2. Calls upon the parties to implement fully the agreements reached in the course of the inter-Tajik talks, and encourages them to sign the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan as a matter of priority;
3. Emphasizes that the implementation of the agreements reached in the course of the inter-Tajik talks will require the consistent good faith and

constant effort of the parties, as well as the sustained and vigorous support of the United Nations and the international community;

4. Calls upon the parties to cooperate further in ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other international personnel;

5. Commends the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the personnel of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with them;

6. Decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT for a period of three months until 15 September 1997;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of significant developments and to present to the Council, as soon as appropriate, detailed recommendations on the role of the United Nations in support of the implementation of the inter-Tajik agreements and the adjustment of the mandate and strength of UNMOT;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/445
11 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
AND RUSSIAN

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995 and 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996,

Recalling also the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex),

1. Welcomes the conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council held in Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997 (S/1997/434, annex) and agrees the designation of Mr. Carlos Westendorp as High Representative in succession to Mr. Carl Bildt;

2. Expresses its warmest appreciation to Mr. Carl Bildt for his work as High Representative;

3. Reaffirms the importance it attaches to the role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and giving guidance to and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved in assisting the parties to implement the Peace Agreement, and also reaffirms that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give his interpretation and make his recommendations, including to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina or its Entities, and make them known publicly.





Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/446
11 June 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a press release issued today,
11 June 1997, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea to
categorically reject the mendacious allegations made by the National Islamic
Front (NIF) regime of the Sudan against my country.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the text of the present
letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Amdemicael KAHSAI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Press release issued on 11 June 1997 by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea

The Eritrean Government has been following statements made by several officials in Khartoum through the Sudanese and other mass media, alleging new Eritrean troop deployments along the border with the Sudan.

The Eritrean Government has been accustomed to a barrage of groundless accusations by the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in the Sudan for more than a year now and categorically rejects those mendacious allegations for what they are. If there is any significance to the new round of allegations, it may only be the fact it betrays an underlying intention to launch an attack against Eritrea. This is indeed demonstrated by the call for a general mobilization being undertaken by the NIF regime along the common borders between the two countries and the provocative threats that Sudanese senior officials have made this week to attack Eritrean cities.

In the event, the Eritrean Government reserves its right of self-defence and warns that the NIF regime alone carries the responsibility for its irresponsible acts.



General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL
A/51/919
S/1997/447
11 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 33
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 9 June 1997 from the Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place during May 1997.

1 May 1997

At 1330 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitude.

3 May 1997


At 1400 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju', Jba', Ayn Bu Siwar, Ayn Qana, Kafr Fila and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1515 hours the Ayn al-Tinah hills in the Western Bekaa district came under artillery fire from Israeli and Lahad forces positions in the border strip. At 1545 hours the Qilya hills came under intermittent artillery fire. The shelling of the Qilya and Ayn al-Tinah hills ceased at 1700 hours and was renewed at 1900 hours, when it extended to the southern outskirts of Mashgharah.

5 May 1997

At 1000 hours an explosive charge was detonated on the Burj al-Muluk road in Marj Uyun district injuring four persons.

At 1135 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at medium altitude.



At 1930 hours outlying areas of Jarju', Arabsalim and Ayn Bu Siwar and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

6 May 1997

At 1125 hours five explosive charges were detonated in Nabatiyah, killing Ibrahim Nasir al-Din and Majid Jabir and wounding a number of other persons.

At 1540 hours the Jabal Ayn al-Tinah heights and the southern outskirts of Mashgharah in Western Bekaa district came under intermittent Israeli artillery fire.

At 1620 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Jabal Ayn al-Tinah heights and the southern outskirts of Mashgharah. One woman was badly injured.

At 1930 hours outlying areas of Frun, Tulin, Ghanduriyah, Qabrikha and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

7 May 1997

At 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitude.

At 1400 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area at low altitude and then carried out a two-stage attack on outlying areas of Arabsalim.

At 1600 hours outlying areas of Ayn Bu Siwar, Jarju' and Arabsalim and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2150 hours outlying areas of Kafra, Yatar, Haris, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Tibnin, Shaqra, Bra'shit and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

12 May 1997

At 1300 hours outlying areas of Jba', Jarju', Arabsalim and Ayn Bu Siwar and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1400 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Luwayzah in the Iqlim al-Tuffah area.

At 1925 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitude, and at 1930 hours they attacked the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills.

13 May 1997

At 0730 hours outlying areas of Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar and areas along the Litani River in the Iqlim al-Tuffah area came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1100 hours outlying areas of Jba', Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Arabsalim and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1630 hours Israeli shelling of outlying areas of Jba', Ayn Bu Siwar, Jarju' and Arabsalim and of the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills was renewed.

14 May 1997

At 0200 hours outlying areas of Tibnin, Safad al-Battikh, Ayta al-Jabal and Haris came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1240 hours the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1900 hours outlying areas of Haris, Haddatha, Kafra and Yatar came under artillery fire from Israeli and Lahad militia positions in the border strip.

At 2030 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitude.

At 2300 hours outlying areas of Bra'shit, Shaqra, Ayta al-Jabal and Tibnin came under Israeli artillery fire.

15 May 1997

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Shaqra, Qabrikha and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2200 hours outlying areas of Zillaya and Libbaya in the Jabal al-Dahr locality came under Israeli artillery fire. It stopped at 0100 hours.

16 May 1997

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Libbaya in the Jabal al-Dahr locality and Zillaya came under intermittent Israeli artillery fire. At the same time, Israeli warplanes made overflights of the area.

At 0750, 0800 and 0815 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Libbaya in the Jabal al-Dahr locality. At 1000 hours they carried out two attacks on outlying areas of the town and made overflights of the area.

At 1045, 1100 and 1107 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Libbaya in the Jabal al-Dahr locality, and outlying areas of Libbaya and Zillaya came under Israeli artillery fire. At the same time Israeli warplanes continued their overflights of the area. A Lebanese Army personnel carrier outside Zillaya was hit in the attack.

17 May 1997

At 1615 hours outlying areas of Yuhmur, Libbaya and Zillaya in Western Bekaa district came under artillery fire from Israeli and Lahad militia positions in the border strip.

At 1830 hours Zillaya and its environs, Jabal al-Dahr and areas along the Litani River came under heavy Israeli artillery fire.

At 2030 hours Israeli warplanes launched three attacks on the Jabal al-Dahr heights while the Israeli artillery bombardment of Yuhmur, Zillaya and Qilya and of areas along the Litani River continued. At the same time, Israeli warplanes overflowed the area.

At 1930 hours members of the Israeli forces on board a naval vessel directed machine-gun fire at the shore between Ra's al-Ayn and Mansuri beach in the southern part of Tyre district.

At 2230 hours Israeli warplanes withdrew from the Western Bekaa area, while the concentrated Israeli artillery bombardment of Zillaya and Qilya and of areas along the Litani River continued.

18 May 1997

At 0630 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Jabal al-Dahr heights, and the vicinity of Ayn al-Tinah, the Jabbur pool, Libbaya, Zillaya and Yuhmur and areas along the Litani River came under Israeli artillery fire. The shelling stopped at 1930 hours.

At 1900 hours outlying areas of Hinniyah, Mansuri and Majdal Slim in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire.

19 May 1997

At 0400 hours three explosive charges about four metres apart were detonated in the Sahl al-Qalilah locality in Tyre district.

At 1000 hours Israeli warplanes overflowed the Na'imah hills.

At 1045 hours outlying areas of Jba', Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Arabaslin came under Israeli artillery fire.

23 May 1997

At 0645 hours the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1000 hours Israeli warplanes overflowed the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitude.

24 May 1997

At 0000 hours outlying areas of Zibqin towards Jibal al-Butm in Tyre district came under heavy Israeli artillery fire in which one person was killed and several others injured.

At 1430 hours outlying areas of Zillaya and Libbaya, areas along the Litani River and Jabal al-Dahr came under Israeli artillery fire.

25 May 1997

At 1150 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at medium altitude.

At 1630 hours the hills around Zilaya came under concentrated Israeli artillery fire. It stopped at 1745 hours.

26 May 1997

At 1645 hours the southern outskirts of Mashgharah, the vicinity of the vocational school and the Ayn al-Tinah hills came under Israeli artillery fire. At 1735 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the southern Mashgharah heights and the Ayn al-Tinah vicinity, firing air-to-surface missiles.

At 1930 hours outlying areas of Qabrikha, Majdal Salm, Sawwanah and Tulin came under Israeli artillery fire.

27 May 1997

For security reasons, Israeli forces prevented the inhabitants of Kafr Killa in Marj Uyun district from leaving the border strip area.

At 1945 hours outlying areas of Majdal Salm, Jumayyimah, Khirbat Salm and Sawwanah came under Israeli artillery fire.

28 May 1997

At 1830 hours outlying areas of Majdal Salm, Qabrikha and Tulin came under Israeli bombardment.

At 2045 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitude.

31 May 1997

At 2020 hours outlying areas of Majdal Salm, Tulin, Qabrikha and Shaqra came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2230 hours Israeli naval forces off the Musayib locality in Tyre district detained two fishermen. They released them at 01.00 hours.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and these fresh attacks and arbitrary practices inflicted on the Lebanese population, which have left a number of casualties and have caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

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English
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I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/52/180
S/1997/448
11 June 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Items 39 and 148 of the
preliminary list*
OCEANS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 10 June 1997 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of paragraph (a) of the section referring to the issue of the occupation of the three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates and relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran that appeared in the press communiqué issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its sixty-third session, held at Riyadh on 31 May 1997.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 39 and 148 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalid Khalifa AL-MUALLA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/52/50.



ANNEX

Extract from a communiqué issued by the Ministerial Council
of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its sixty-third session,
held at Riyadh on 31 May 1997

The issue of the occupation of the three islands belonging to the United Arab
Emirates and relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran

(a) The issue of the occupation of the three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates

The Ministerial Council studied developments in the matter of the occupation of the three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, belonging to the United Arab Emirates. The Council noted that the Iranian Government continued to implement measures aimed at consolidating its occupation of the three islands, carrying to extremes the policy of using force to impose the status quo. This represents a determination to proceed with its unjustified and provocative actions. The Council reiterated its deep regret at the continuing failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond to the repeated sincere and serious invitations to seek a solution to this issue by peaceful means offered by the United Arab Emirates and regional and international organizations and groups. The Ministerial Council expressed its disapproval of the successive measures taken by Iran in the islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates and its continuing concern as to the results of the Iranian Government's extremism in pursuing the policy of using force to impose the status quo in the three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, in violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates and in encroachment of the latter's rights in these islands. Peace and security in the region are threatened thereby, and the principles and precepts of international law and the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference completely disregarded, together with the principles of good-neighbourliness and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the region.

The Council reaffirmed the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and its absolute support for all the peaceful measures being taken to recover its sovereignty over these islands. The Council reiterated its appeal to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands, suspend its policy of using force to impose the status quo, halt construction of all Iranian installations on the islands intended to alter the demographic structure and remove any existing installations, annul any unilateral decisions already imposed on the three islands and employ peaceful means to resolve the conflict over them in accordance with the principles and rules of international law, which would include accepting that the matter could be dealt with by the International Court of Justice.



Security Council

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S/1997/449
12 June 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1997 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my report to the Security Council concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, dated 25 April 1997 (S/1997/340), in which I informed members, inter alia, of my intention to appoint a resident Special Representative for Georgia as a successor to my current Special Envoy for Georgia, Ambassador Edouard Brunner.

I wish to place on record my deep appreciation for his dedicated work of four years.

I now wish to inform members that I have appointed Mr. Liviu Bota (Romania) to the above-mentioned position with effect from 1 July 1997. As the Council is aware, Mr. Bota has been serving as the resident deputy to my Special Envoy for Georgia and as Head of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) since 1 October 1995. Mr. Bota will be based in Tbilisi and Sukhumi where he will continue to perform the functions of Head of Mission.

The Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz leadership have expressed their continued readiness to cooperate fully with Mr. Bota in his new function.

I should be grateful if you would bring the information contained in the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN





Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1997/449*
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(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

* Reissued for technical reasons.

